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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UCA 78A-3-102. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues 
The Supreme Court has granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari as follows: 
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari is granted as to the following issues: 
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding rule 60 of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure was applicable to the Labor Commission's adjudicative proceedings. 
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in addressing the applicability of rule 60 (a) 
of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the applicability of the discovery rule to Respondent 
Frito-Lay's rule 60 (b) motion. 
Standards of Review 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals for 
correctness, with no deference for the Court of Appeals5 conclusions of law. Bear River 
Mutual Ins. Co.. v Wall 978 P.2d 460, 461. 
Legal Questions: 
On appeal, the court reviews "the Commission's interpretations of law under a 
correction-of-error standard." Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051, 1052 
(Utah 1984). 
Fact Questions: 
On appeal, the court reviews "the Commission's factual findings under a deferential 
standard." Tax Common v. Industrial Common, 685 P.2d 1051, 1052 (Utah 1984). Such a 
deferential standard involves a review of the "factual determinations to see whether they are 
£
 supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record. ' . . . Substantial 
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evidence has been described as 'that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is 
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.'" Acosta v. Labor 
Commission, 44 P.3d 819, 826 (Utah App. 2002). Further, 
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of the Commission, the 
findings must be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached. . . . The failure of an agency to make adequate findings of fact on 
material issues renders its findings arbitrary and capricious unless the evidence 
is clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one conclusion. 
Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission. 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App. 1990). 
Mixed Questions: 
"A mixed question of law and fact [is] reviewed for reasonableness and rationality." 
Acosta v. Labor Commission, 44 P.3d 819, 822 (Utah App. 2002). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
UCA34A-2-420(l) 
(a) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each 
case shall be continuing. 
(b) After notice and hearing, the Division of Adjudication, 
commissioner, or Appeals Board in accordance with Part 8, 
Adjudication, may from time to time modify or change a former 
finding or order of the commission. 
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
UCA 63G-4-301 
UCA34A-2-410(l)(a) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The Utah Labor Commission appeals the Utah Court of Appeals decision on August 
28, 2008. 
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February 12, 2001 to October 22, 2002 Litigation 
On February 12, 2001, Clausing filed an Application for Hearing with the Labor 
Commission requesting Temporary Total Disability (hereafter sometimes referred to as 
"TTD") as well as medical expenses from a March 18,1999 incident. (Rec. 360). It was soon 
thereafter amended to seek Permanent Partial Disability and recommended medical care. 
(Rec. 362, 364). The injuries complained of were to the: 1) knee; 2) elbow; and 3) lumbar 
spine. (Rec. 364). The parties settled these matters at a hearing on Januaryl4, 2002. (Rec. 
364-368,371). No settlement documents were ever executed and signed, however, and at the 
request of Clausing's attorney, the Administrative Law Judge, Judge Sharon J. Eblen, issued 
a October 22, 2002 Order based on the January 14, 2002 in-court settlement stipulations of 
the parties. (Rec. 364-365). The settlement, and October 22, 2002 Order, approved 
Permanent Partial Impairment of 8.5% and awarded all medical expenses for the 1) knee, 2) 
elbow, and 3) lumbar spine. (Rec. 364-368). No TTD was awarded. 
Appellant's Brief notes this non-award of TTD benefits, but implies that TTD claims 
arising prior to October 22, 2002 were reserved for determination at a later date. This is 
incorrect. As noted above, the October 22,2002 order was based upon an in-court settlement 
of October 14, 2002 under which no TTD was owed. Because no TTD was owed under the 
settlement, the October 22,2002 order did not award TTD. (Rec. 364-368). Its omission was 
entirely appropriate and understandable - Clausing was working as of October 22,2002, and 
all prior work missed had already been paid to her. (Rec. 107). As of October 22, 2002, no 
TTD amounts were owed. 
July 17, 2003 to September 23, 2005 Litigation 
On or about July 17, 2003, Clausing filed a second Application for Hearing, again 
claiming injuries to the 1) knee, 2) elbow, and 3) lumbar spine from the March 18, 1999 
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incident. (Rec. 1). She also included new claims relating to her neck and a stroke. (Rec. 1). 
Clausing sought Permanent Partial Disability, medical expenses, Temporary Partial 
Disability, recommended medical care, travel expenses, interest and Temporary Total 
Disability for "only misc. dates missed after surgeries or for treatment prior to MMI." (Rec. 
376-377). As stated above, this 2003 claim involved new neck and stroke claims, and 
consequently, the requested TTD related to TTD arising from alleged neck and stroke 
injuries. Clausing had been employed at various times from the incident date of March 1999 
and MMI occurred, which Clausing admits was prior to April 2004 as to the non-neck and 
stroke claims. (Rec. 377). The parties entered into a Stipulation setting forth the dates which 
Clausing did not work from at least March 18, 1999 through September 2004. (Rec. 105-
112). The parties thereafter agreed to submit the claims neck and stroke claims to a medical 
panel. (Rec. 105-112, 152). The medical panel determined that the new neck and stroke 
claims were not related to the March 1999 injury, which confirmed the April 2004 MMI date 
of the non-neck and stroke claims referenced above. (Reel 16, 118, 153, 377). 
The Administrative Law Judge, Judge Dale Sessions, then issued his September 23, 
2005 Order. In the order, Judge Sessions 1) expressly incorporated the Stipulation setting 
forth the work missed between March 18,1999 and June 10,2004,2) stated that TTD would 
be owed for the period between March 18, 1999 and June 10, 2004, 3) stated that any 
amounts previously paid should be credited, and 4) rejected the neck and stroke claims. 
(Rec. 151-154). According to the Stipulation and the existing credits, at most, Clausing 
could have qualified for no more than 9.14 weeks of TTD, assuming that those 9.14 weeks 
were missed because of a compensable injury. There was no compensable neck or stroke 
injury. Clausing knew this and knowingly entered the Stipulation. The limited nature of the 
TTD claims are likewise confirmed by Clausing's application which, as of July 17, 2003, 
„4_ 
only requested TTD compensation for undefined "misc. dates" prior to reaching MMI. 
Under these undisputed and acknowledged facts, Frito-Lay reasonably interpreted the 
September 2005 order as awarding no more than a maximum of 9.14 weeks of TTD, or 
$4,451.18. On December 1, 2005, however, over 2 months after the September 2005 order 
was issued, Clausing intentionally misinterpreted the order and demanded $123,061.20, 
which she later increased to $183,561.85. (Rec. 157). Not only is the intentional 
misinterpretation evidenced by the Stipulation and the other acknowledged facts, but it is 
expressly admitted by Clausing's own attorney in an affidavit. (Rec. 393-394). 
Frito-Lay should not have, and could not have, expected Clausing to misinterpret the 
September 2005 order in such a way. This was not a case of dueling reasonable 
interpretations. In light of the known and acknowledged facts, Clausing's interpretation 
simply was not reasonable, as it demanded 4100% of the maximum $4,451.18 that could 
have possibly been awarded. Frito-Lay's action or inaction between September 23,2005 and 
December 1,2005 must be viewed in light of these facts. Frito-Lay had no reasonable reason 
to believe that the September 2005 order awarded $183,561.85 instead of the maximum 
amount possible under the Stipulation - $4,451.18. 
The facts showing the knowledge held by the parties between the September 2005 
order and December 1, 2005 are of utmost importance. However, these facts are entirely 
discounted and ignored in the Appellant's Brief. Appellant's Brief incorrectly characterizes 
the September 23, 2005 Order as if it were not merely subject to different reasonable 
interpretations, but as if it were actually mutually understood to award $183,561.85. That 
is a false characterization. In fact, Clausing's interpretation was completely unreasonable. 
Clausing's admitted misinterpretation was not only contrary to the acknowledged evidence, 
but also to the September 23,2005 Order which incorporated the Stipulation. Consequently, 
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Frito-Lay's subsequent filings with the ALJ and Labor Commission Appeals Board were 
entirely appropriate and timely. 
Course of Proceedings 
On December 21,2005, upon learning of the Clausing7 s intent to claim $183,561.85 
rather than the maximum possible under the Stipulation of $4,451.18, Frito-Lay filed a timely 
motion asking for relief from Clausing's misinterpretation of the September 2005 Order. The 
motion was denied on March 17, 2006 purportedly because it contained "insufficient 
grounds," was not a proper motion, and was not timely filed Then on April 17, 2006 Frito-
Lay filed a timely Motion for Review with the Appeals Board of the Labor Commission. On 
October 23, 2006, the Appeals Board stated that it was "aware that Judge Session's 
[September 2005 Order] may have awarded excessive temporary total disability 
compensation to Ms. Clausing," but nevertheless refused to remedy the improper order 
because Frito-Lay was not entitled to file a "Rule 60(b)" motion, or its equivalent, with the 
Labor Commission. 
The Frito-Lay appealed the Labor Commission rulings, which was heard by the Utah 
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued its decision on August 28, 2008. The Labor 
Commission thereafter filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court, 
which was granted. 
FACTS 
1. On February 9, 2001, Clausing filed her first Application for Hearing, requesting 
medical expenses and temporary total compensation from a March 18, 1999 incident. (Rec. 
360). The Application was amended on October 11, 2001, to include a claim for 
recommended medical treatment and permanent partial impairment. (Rec. 362, 364). 
2. At hearing, on January 14, 2002, the parties reached a settlement agreement, which 
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was reduced to an Order by Judge Sharon Eblen on October 22, 2002, which resolved all 
prior claims. (Rec. 364-368, 371). 
3. Ten months later, on July 17, 2003, Petitioner filed another Application for 
Hearing again based on the March 18, 1999 incident. In addition to the previous injuries, 
Clausing claimed a neck injury and a stroke. Clausing sought Permanent Partial Disability, 
medical expenses, Temporary Partial Disability, recommended medical care, travel expenses, 
interest and Temporary Total Disability (hereafter referred to as "TTD"). (Rec. 1). 
4. Clausing's July 2003 Application material did not identify any time allegedly 
missed from work as a result of the injuries. (Rec. 1). 
5. On April 12, 2004, Clausing filed her Prehearing Disclosures, limiting the TTD 
compensation claims to "only misc. dates missed after surgeries or for treatment prior to 
MMI." Clausing's Prehearing Disclosures also admit that she reached MMI for all injuries, 
other than the neck injury, prior to April 12, 2004.(Rec. 376-377). 
6. The Parties entered a Stipulation containing the following work history from 
March 18, 1999 to September 14, 2004: 
5/17/99, working with Frito-Lay 
12/29/99, working with Orbit (20 hrs/week) 
1/10/00, not working (surgery) 
2/28/00, working with Orbit (40 hrs/week) 
4/30/00, working with Orbit (20 hrs/week) 
5/20/00, working with Orbit (40 hrs/week) 
5/30/00, not working (surgery) 
6/21/00, working with Orbit (40 hrs/week) 
6/28/00, not working (surgery) 
8/16/00, working with Orbit (40 hrs/week) 
9/11/00, not working (surgery) 
10/2/00, working with Orbit (20 hrs/week) 
4/4/02, working with Orbit (40 hrs/week) 
4/18/02, not working (surgery) 
5/30/02, working with Orbit (20 hrs/week) 
3/18/99 
5/8/99 
12/30/99 
1/11/00 
2/29/00 
5/1/00 
5/21/00 
5/31/00 
6/22/00 
6/29/00 
8/17/00 
9/12/00 
10/3/00 
4/5/02 
4/19/02 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
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5/31/02 
10/20/02 
5/5/03 
3/1/04 
5/25/04 
6/25/04 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
10/19/02, working with Orbit (40 hrs/week) 
5/5/03, working with ISG (40 hrs/week) 
3/1/04, not working (laid off) 
6/25/04, working with Pacific Rim (40 hrs/week) 
(Laid off) 
9/14/04, not working 
(Rec. 109). 
7. The Parties submitted the case to a Medical Panel based on the Stipulation which 
identified the issues in dispute as "the claimed stroke from the August 17, 2000 right knee 
surgery, medical causation of the neck injury, reasonableness of the proposed neck surgery, 
and whether additional medical care for the right knee is necessary and related to the 
industrial injury." TTD was not included in the Stipulation, and therefore, not an issue for 
the Medical Panel. (Rec. 105-111). 
8. The Medical Panel determined that the neck injury was not related to the March 
18, 1999 incident, and that there was no evidence of any stroke. (Ree l 16, 118, 153). 
9. On September 23, 2005, Judge Sessions entered an Order stating: 
9. Petitioner is awarded temporary total disability compensation from 
March 18, 1999 to June 10, 2004. The applicable computation rate is 
$487.00 per week. 
14. [Frito-Lay] is permitted an offset for amounts previously paid by [Frito-
Lay] in all areas of this award. 
16. Finally, Petitioner's claims related to stroke and cervical injury are 
expressly denied. 
(Rec. 151-154). 
10. The Court, in its September 2003 Order, recognized and incorporated the 
Stipulation setting forth Clausing's work dates. (Rec. 152). 
11. Under the September 23, 2005 Order incorporating the Stipulation, the parties knew 
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that the total amount owed for time not worked between March 18, 1999 to June 10, 2004 
was 9.14 weeks, which was the equivalent of $4,451.18 in TTD compensation. (Rec. 109). 
12. On December 1, 2005, Clausing, for the first time asserted that she was entitled 
to $123,061.20 for Temporary Total Disability from March 18,1999 to June 10,2004. This 
amount was based on the $487.00 weekly compensation rate multiplied by 190.88 weeks 
during the stated period, plus interest. (Rec. 394). On December 20,2005 Clausing increased 
her demand to $183,561.85. (Rec. 157) 
13. Clausing's attorney, Dawn Atkin, admitted that the December 2005 demands were 
entirely based on Clausing's intentional misinterpretation of the September 23,2005 Order, 
was admittedly not based on the evidence, and was contrary to the work history and the 
parties' Stipulation. (Rec. 393-394). 
14. On December 6, 2005, Frito-Lay's Counsel sent a letter to Dawn Atkin disputing 
the $123,061.20 claimed. (Rec. 404-405). 
15. On December 21, 2005, within 20 days of learning of claim for $123,061.20, 
Frito-Lay filed a motion requesting relief from the Clausing's intentional misinterpretation 
of the September 23, 2005 Order. (Rec. 163). 
16. On March 17, 2006, the motion for relief was denied with Judge Sessions asserting 
that he had no authority to address the issue or mistake, and taking the position that the order 
says what it says. (Rec. 334-336). 
17. On April 17, 2006, the Frito-Lay filed a Motion for Review with the Appeals 
Board of the Labor Commission within 30 days of Judge Sessions's order. (Rec.338-339). 
18. On October 23,2006, the Appeals Board recognized that the language, as interpreted, 
was contrary to the factual evidence, but nonetheless denied the Motion for Review, 
asserting that it had no authority to correct the mistake. (Rec. 460-463). 
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19. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals ordered the Labor Commission Appeals 
Board to "correct the error of omitting a reference to the Stipulation and to recalculate 
Clausing's award to include no more tha[n] what she was entitled to under the terms of the 
Stipulation." (Court of Appeals Opinion, Conclusion, attached hereto as Exhibit A). 
INTRODUCTION 
As stated in the Facts section, prior to the ALJ's September 2005 Order, the parties 
entered into a Stipulation determining the period for which TTD compensation could 
possibly be awarded between March 18, 1999 to June 10, 2004. The ALJ accepted that 
Stipulation and specifically incorporated it into the September 2005 Order. Under that 
Stipulation, Clausing could be entitled to a maximum of 9.14 weeks, or a total of $4,451.18 
(9.14 weeks x $487.00) for all work missed from March 18, 1999 to June 10, 2004. (Rec. 
109). The neck and stroke injuries were not legitimate. (Rec. 114-119). There has never 
been any material dispute on this issue. 
In addition to the Stipulation, the parties also recognized the following undisputed 
facts as of September 2005: 1) Clausing had already settled all claims for damages for the 
period between March 1999 and January 14, 2002 (Rec. 364-368, 371); 2) the ALJ 
judicially confirmed the settlement of all claims as of October 22,2002 (Rec. 364-368,371); 
3) Clausing requested TTD benefits for "only misc. dates after surgeries or for treatment 
prior to MMI" (Rec. 376-377); 4) Clausing received payment for all TTD benefits for those 
very same "misc. dates after surgeries" from March 18, 1999 to January 14,2002 (Rec. 216, 
404-405); and 5) temporary benefits were never an issue presented to the medical panel (Rec. 
105-111). 
It was under these known facts that the ALJ issued its September 2005 Order, which 
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1) incorporated the Stipulation, 2) awarded petitioner "temporary total disability 
compensation from March 18,1999 to June 10,2004, 3) "permitted [Frito-Lay] an offset for 
amounts previously paid . . . in all areas of this award," and 4) rejected the neck and stroke 
claims. (Rec. 151-154). Considering the acknowledged facts that all claims up to October 
22,2002 had already been settled, that temporary total disability payments had already been 
received, and that the Stipulation had been entered into, Frito-Lay reasonably concluded that 
the September 2005 order awarded could only amount to a maximum of $4,451.18 (9.14 
weeks x $487.00) under the Stipulation. However, on December 1, 2005, Clausing 
demanded, for the first time, that the September 2005 order required the payment of 
$123,061.20 in temporary disability compensation. On December 20, 2005, Clausing 
increased the demand to $183,561.85, which is roughly 4100% more than the maximum 
possible of $4,451.18. 
Clausing subsequently issued an affidavit to the Labor Commission in which her 
attorney admitted that she knew that her demand was contrary to the known facts and 
incorrect. Despite this, Clausing nevertheless clung to the intentional misinterpretation of 
the September 2005 Order. Clausing's purpose is clear. She wants to collect $183,561.85 
to which she was admittedly never entitled. Once Frito-Lay discovered that Clausing was 
demanding $183,561.85, supposedly under the September 2005, Frito-Lay filed timely 
motions with the ALJ and the Labor Commission Appeals Board. These motions were 
rejected because both the ALJ and Appeals Board alleged that they had no authority to 
correct the incorrect interpretation of the September 2005 Order. On appeal to the Court of 
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Appeals, the Labor Commission was finally instructed that it not only could, but should, 
correct the mistake and award only that which was permitted by the Stipulation. 
ARGUMENT 
The Labor Commission presents two questions for review. First, the Labor 
Commission asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Second, the Labor Commission asserts that the Court of Appeals erred 
in applying Rule 60(a) and UCA 63G-4-301 (formerly numbered as 63-46b-12) because, the 
Labor Commission contends, these issues were not raised before the Appeals Board. As the 
second issue is dispositive, it will be addressed first. The discussion of Rule 60 and its 
involvement in this case will be addressed second. 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION WAS JUSTIFIED INDEPENDENTLY 
OF RULE 60. 
One of the acknowledged issues on appeal was whether Frito-Lay's "motion may be 
considered a motion for agency review." Frito Lay v. Labor Commission and Amy C. 
Clausing, 2008 UT App 314, par. 21. The Appeals Court noted that "If the nature of the 
motion can be ascertained from the substance of the instrument, we have heretofore held that 
an improper caption is not fatal to that motion." Id. Based upon this principle, the Appeals 
Court correctly held that Frito-Lay' s motion could be considered, under the "discovery rule," 
a timely motion for agency review. 
The Labor Commission does not address this basis for the Court of Appeals' opinion. 
In fact, the Labor Commission does not even directly address the issue. As such, the 
"discovery rule" as a basis for the opinion is not disputed. Therefore, the Court of Appeals' 
holding should be sustained. Further, as shown below, even if the "discovery rule" had been 
addressed in this appeal, the Court of Appeals's holding was nevertheless correct. 
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A. UCA 63G-4-301 Was Raised at the Appeals Board Level. 
The Labor Commission asserted in its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, and it implies 
it here, that the "discovery rule" was not properly before the Court of Appeals because UCA 
63G-4-301 was allegedly not raised at the Appeals Board level. The assertion that UCA 63G-
4-301 was not raised at the Appeals Board level, is completely false. 
UCA 63G-4-301 permits parties to adjudicative proceedings to seek a motion for 
agency review. The Labor Commission's administrative rule R602-2-1 specifically permits 
"Motions for Review" as authorized by "UCA 63G-4-301." Frito-Lay filed a Motion for 
Review exactly as authorized by both UCA 63G-4-301 and R602-2-1. In fact, the motion 
itself is specifically titled as a "Motion for Review." (Rec 338-358). 
UCA 63G-4-301 was clearly at issue before the Appeals Board, and was therefore a 
proper subject for appeal with the Utah Appeals Court. 
B. The Motion for Review Was Timely under the "Discovery Rule." 
Although it is not argued in any significant detail, the Labor Commission also implies 
that even if UCA 63G-4-301 was before the Appeals Board, Frito-Lay's motion was not 
timely because it allegedly had not been filed within 30 days of the September 2005 order, 
as required under UCA 63G-4-301 and R602-2-1. This assertion simply repeats one of the 
errors committed by the Appeals Board when it refused to address the merits of Frito-Lay's 
Motion for Review.1 Both the Appeals Board and the Labor Commission are wrong. 
As explained above, there was no reasonable basis to believe that the September 2005 
order awarded the $183,561.85 demanded by Clausing. In fact, until December 1, 2005, 
when Clausing made her knowingly unjustified demand, the meaning of the September 2005 
1
 Incidentally, the very fact that the Appeals Board addressed the alleged untimeliness of Frito-
Lay's motion shows that UCA 63G-4-301 was indeed an issue before the Appeals Board. 
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order was not disputed. Both Clausing and Frito-Lay knew that under the Stipulation, which 
was incorporated into the September 2005 order, that only $4,451.18 could possibly be owed. 
Because of Clausing's extraordinary demand for 4100% more than she was entitled, Frito-
Lay filed a motion to have the ALJ correct any basis for Clausing's demand. As a practical 
matter, such a motion was required. If not filed, the meaning of the September 2005 Order 
would have remained in dispute, and the litigation would have remained perpetually 
unresolved. Clausing would have gone on demanding $183,561.85, and Frito-Lay would 
have continued to insist that it was not owed. Such motions are not out of the ordinary in 
these situations, as is evident by the existence of Rule 52 and 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This is particularly true under the more flexible and informal Labor Commission 
proceedings. See Pilcher v. State Department of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983) 
The ALJ issued his order on Frito-Lay's motion on March 17,2006, essentially wiping 
his hands of the matter by stating that the motion had not been filed within 30 days, and there 
were "insufficient grounds" to correct the error. The ALJ incorporated Clausing's 
misinterpretation, despite the fact that Clausing's own attorney admitted that the 
interpretation was contrary to the Stipulation. (Rec. 407-409). The March 17, 2006 Order 
was the first order to make the dispute appealable under a Motion for Review. Prior to 
March 17, 2006, the meaning of the September 2005 Order could not be appealed for the 
simple reason that, from December 1,2005 to March 17,2006, the meaning of the September 
2005 Order was unknown and disputed. Once the ALJ issued his March 17, 2006 Order, the 
meaning of the September 2005 Order was resolved, the errors of the ALJ were clear, and 
the appropriate Motion for Review was filed based upon the March 17, 2006 Order. 
The Appeals Court correctly recognized that "Frito-Lay did not discover Clausing's 
miscalculation of the award until December 1, 2005. Thus, using the discovery rule to 
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calculate the tolling period, Frito-Lay's motion was within the thirty-day time period for a 
motion for agency review." Frito Lay v. Labor Commission and Amy C. Clausing, 2008 UT 
App 314, fn. 6. Importantly, the Labor Commission provides no evidence to dispute the 
Court of Appeals' application of the "discovery rule." In fact, the Labor Commission does 
not even address the facts upon which the Court of Appeals based its application of the 
"discovery rule." Rather, the Labor Commission appears to take the same position that 
Clausing took before the Court of Appeals - "that UAPA prohibits the correction of errors 
if the error is not discovered within thirty days." Frito Lay v. Labor Commission and Amy 
C. Clausing, 2008 UT App 314, par. 21. This position ignores the fact that "the legislature 
has directed that worker's compensation proceedings are not to be burdened with 
technicalities but are to be conducted so as to protect the substantial rights of the parties 
within the spirit of the workers' compensation statutes." Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 770 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah 1989)(cited in Frito Lay v. Labor Commission and 
Amy C. Clausing, 2008 UT App 314). This position also directly contradicts the fact that the 
Appeals Board "retained jurisdiction and had the inherent authority to reconsider or modify 
its (previous order) in light of subsequently discovered facts. (Citation omitted)." Frito Lay 
v. Labor Commission and Amy C. Clausing, 2008 UT App 314, at par. 15. 
The "discovery rule" is applicable here. It was correctly applied by the Utah Court 
of Appeals. Importantly, the Labor Commission has not directly appealed, and has certainly 
failed to present evidence, to show that the Court of Appeals' application of the "discovery 
rule" was error. The Appeals Board had the authority and obligation to correct the ALJ's 
mistakes, and it was not error for the Appeals Court to so order. 
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C- The Court of Appeals5 Holding Is Not Dependent on Rule 60. 
Frito-Lay's Motion for Review, which was filed pursuant to UCA 63G-4-301, raised 
UCA 63G-4-301 at the Appeals Board level. Consequently, UCA 63G-4-301 was properly 
addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Court of Appeals determined that under 
the "discovery rule" Frito-Lay' s motion was a proper and timely "motion for agency review" 
under UCA 63G-4-301. Frito Lay v. Labor Commission and Amy C. Clausing, 2008 UT App 
314, par. 21. As a properly filed motion for agency review under UCA 63G-4-301, the Labor 
Commission should have corrected the ALJ's errors instead of claiming an inability to do so. 
Therefore, even if the Court of Appeals, for argument's sake, improperly applied Rule 
60(a) and (b) as presently claimed by the Labor Commission, the Court of Appeals' holding 
should still not be reversed. It must be remembered that at most, Rule 60(a) and (b) were 
merely additional bases justifying the Court of Appeals' final holding. The application of 
the "discovery rule" to UCA 63G-4-301, by itself, is a sufficient basis for the Court of 
Appeals final holding. Because an independent basis for the holding exists, the Rule 60 
issues are moot. "A case is deemed moot when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the 
rights of the litigants." Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 872 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Utah App. 1994). 
In State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840 (Utah 1994) the Utah Supreme Court addressed the 
exact issue present here. In Sims, the lower court found that the State's actions violated both 
the Utah Constitution and the Federal Constitution, and therefore ruled against the State. The 
State filed an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court arguing that the lower court erred in 
determining that the State had violated the Utah Constitution. The State, however, did not 
appeal the lower court's determination that the State had violated the Federal Constitution. 
The Supreme Court explained: 
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The State's decision to challenge the state ruling but not the federal leaves the 
case in a unique procedural posture. Even if we were to adopt the State's 
arguments concerning article I, section 14, and reverse the court of appeals' 
state constitutional holding, it would have no legal effect on the parties. 
Because the State chose not to challenge the court of appeals' Fourth 
Amendment holding, and because the Fourth Amendment establishes the 
minimum level of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, the 
evidence seized at the roadblock must be suppressed regardless of any decision 
we might render on the state constitutional issue. There simply is no decision 
we could render in this case that would allow the State to introduce the 
evidence seized at the roadblock. The issue is therefore moot. 
Id., at 841. Just as in Sims, there is no decision that the Supreme Court could render in our 
case that would reverse the Court of Appeals. The Rule 60 issues are moot because there is 
another basis for the Court of Appeals' holding. And just as in Sims, the Supreme Court 
should reject the appeal. 
II. THE APPEALS BOARD'S AUTHORITY TO CORRECT MISTAKES UNDER 
THE SAME PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN RULE 60 IS LONG RECOGNIZED 
LAW, 
It is Frito-Lay's position that the Court of Appeals' position is independently justified 
under the arguments presented in Section I above, and that the Supreme Court need not 
address Rule 60 in order to sustain the Court of Appeals' holding. Nevertheless, the Labor 
Commission argues that the Appeals Court improperly applied Rule 60 principles. If the 
Court chooses to address this issue, Frito-Lay includes the following response. 
Rule 60 provides a list of circumstances under which a party may obtain relief from 
a judgment or an order. Nothing in Rule 60, as it applies in this case, is inconsistent with the 
UAPA, the Utah Code, or established Labor Commission regulations. UCA 34A-2-420(l) 
states that "[t]he powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be 
continuing." More specifically, the statute states that "[ajfter notice and hearing, the 
Division of Adjudication, commissioner, or Appeals Board. . . may from time to time modify 
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or change a former finding or order from the commission." The Appeals Court recognized, 
and the Labor Commission does not dispute, that just as Rule 60 allows District Courts the 
discretion to set aside a judgment or order, the Appeal Board "retained jurisdiction and had 
the inherent authority to reconsider or modify its (previous order) in light of subsequently 
discovered facts. (Citation omitted)." Frito Lay v. Labor Commission and Amy C. Clausing, 
2008 UT App 314, at par. 15. Even the Court of Appeals' dissent acknowledged that the 
Appeals Board is fully authorized to correct prior orders "in light of subsequently discovered 
facts." Frito Lay v. Labor Commission and Amy C. Clausing, 2008 UT App 314, par. 34. 
The discretion given to the Appeals Board to correct its orders under its continuing 
jurisdiction is long settled law. In fact, that discretion is much broader than the discretion 
granted District Courts under Rule 60 to correct mistakes. Frito-Lay's Motion for Review 
alleging a mistake under Rule 60 was well within the scope of the Appeals Board's discretion 
under its continuing jurisdiction. The Appeals Board could have, and should have recognized 
its continuing jurisdiction. Instead, the Appeals Board held that it had absolutely no authority 
to correct mistakes, even though it recognized that the ALJ may have indeed awarded TTD 
to which Clausing was not entitled. As a consequence, Frito-Lay was wrongfully ordered 
to pay Clausing $183,561.85, instead of the maximum of $4,451.18 allowable under the 
Stipulation. 
There is nothing inconsistent between the principles of Rule 60, as applied here, and 
the principle of continuing jurisdiction. The Appeals Board should have addressed the merits 
of the Motion for Review, and under its continuing jurisdiction, should have corrected the 
ALJ's mistake. The Appeals Board erred in holding that it was powerless to correct the 
error. Although the Labor Commission contends that continuing jurisdiction was not a basis 
for the Court of Appeals5 holding, the language of the opinion shows otherwise. The 
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Appeals Court discussing "continuing jurisdiction" and held that "Administrative agencies 
in Utah 'have the power to reconsider their decisions in the absence of statutory provisions 
to the contrary.' A belatedly discovered error in the amount of Clausing's award, which error 
both parties conceded occurred, constitutes a subsequently discovered factual mistake well 
within the power of the ALJ to correct." Frito Lay v. Labor Commission and Amy C. 
Clausing, 2008 UT App 314, par. 15. This holding was correct. The Appeals Board had the 
authority and obligation to correct the mistake. 
Finally, even if the Appeals Court had not justified its holding on the grounds of 
"continuing jurisdiction," the Supreme Court should. On certiorari, the Supreme Court 
reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness, with no deference for the Court 
of Appeals' conclusions of law. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., v Wall 978 P.2d 460, 461. 
III. THE CLERICAL ERROR ISSUE WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE APPEALS 
BOARD. 
The Labor Commission also argues that the Utah Court of Appeals based its decision 
in part upon the application of Rule 60(a) allowing a court to correct a clerical error, which 
the Utah Labor Commission contends was not raised before the Appeals Board. This is 
likewise incorrect. 
As with all motions, the Motion for Review here should be viewed in light of its 
content. The content of the Motion for Review makes clear that considering the undisputed 
evidence accepted by the ALJ, including the Stipulation, the ALJ's order must have been a 
consequence of a clerical error. The Motion for Review explains that the parties entered a 
Stipulation that was incorporated by the ALJ. The Motion for Review also made clear that 
according to that Stipulation, Clausing was not entitled to temporary disability compensation 
from March 18, 1999 to June 10, 2004, but rather, only for a small portion thereof. The 
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Motion for Review also emphasizes that Clausing's own attorney admits that the order, as 
misinterpreted by Clausing, contradicts the Stipulation. Despite the clear and undisputed 
evidence, as the Motion for Review makes clear, the ALJ incorrectly issued a statement in 
his September 2005 Order which, if misinterpreted as Clausing insists, directly contradicts 
the undisputed evidence. The Motion for Review takes the position that if the September 
2005 Order were to be interpreted incorrectly as Clausing insisted, then such a 
misinterpretation can only be the result of the ALJ's clerical error. 
Additionally, even if the Motion for Review had not argued that the ALJ's decision 
was a simple error in drafting, the fact remains that the Motion for Review was indeed filed. 
Each Motion for Review, by its very nature, implies that the Appeals Board, with its 
continuing jurisdiction, has the authority to correct the mistakes of the ALJ, whether they be 
legal, factual or clerical. The movant is not required to use magic words, but rather, may 
simply set forth the facts showing the ALJ's mistakes and requesting the Appeals Board to 
correct that mistake. The Appeals Board not only failed to correct the mistake, but instead, 
incorrectly held that it had no authority to correct the mistake. Under such circumstances, 
the issue of whether the ALJ made a clerical mistake was certainly at issue at the Appeals 
Board level. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals' holding should be upheld regardless of whether Rule 60 was 
applied or misapplied. The Appeals Board had full authority to act upon the Motion for 
Review and correct the mistakes of the ALJ. It erred in claiming an inability to do so. 
Further, the principles underlying Rule 60 are also applicable in Labor Commission 
proceedings. The Labor Commission, in fact, has broader discretion than the discretion 
allowed to District Courts under Rule 60. The application of Rule 60 principles - i.e., 
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allowing the Appeals Board to correct errors when necessary - is not error. Indeed, it is part 
of the continuing jurisdiction of the Appeals Board which is part of the Labor Commission. 
The Appeals Court properly addressed the agency review and "discovery rule" issues 
previously raised with the Appeals Board. The Appeals Court properly recognized the 
Appeals Board's continuing jurisdiction and obligation to correct errors. The Appeals 
Court's holding should be sustained. Frito-Lay should not be required to pay Clausing 
4100% more than what Clausing admits could possibly be owed under the Stipulation and 
the evidence in the case. 
Respectfully submitted this i ^ d a y of February 2009. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
JOHN H. ROMNEY 
Attorneys for Frito-Lay 
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